Maintenance Contract With Imperfect Preventive Maintenance
Abstract: In this paper, we
study performance based maintenance contracts for heavy equipment operated in a
mining industry. A performance based service contract uses an attractive
incentives to motivate the agent to increase the maintenance effort such that
the resulting equipment’s performance is well above the target. This will in
turn give benefits for both the owner of the trucks and the Agent of service contract.
In this paper, we study performance based maintenance service contracts for the
equipment sold with warranty and the perfomances considered includes
availability and safety measures. We find the optimal strategy (i.e. price of
each contract and maintenance effort) for the agent and the optimal option for
the owner using a non-cooperative game formulation
Keywords: imperfect preventive
maintenance; maintenance contract; non-cooperative game formulation
Penulis: Hennie Husniah, B P
Iskandar
Kode Jurnal: jptindustridd150582
