Forest insurance market participants’ game behavior in China: An analysis based on tripartite dynamic game model
Abstract: In forest insurance
market, there are three main participants including the insurance company, the
forest farmer and the government. As different participant has different
benefit object, there will be a complex and dynamic game relationship among all
participants. The purpose of this paper is to make the game relationship among
all participants in forest insurance market clear, and then to put forward some
policy suggestions on the implementation of forest insurance from the view of
game theory.
Design/methodology/approach: Firstly, the static game model between the
insurance company and the forest farmer is set up. According to the result of
static game model, it’s difficult to implement forest insurance without
government. Secondly, the tripartite dynamic game model among the government,
the insurance company and the forest farmer is proposed, and the equilibrium
solution of tripartite dynamic game model is acquired. Finally, the behavioral
characteristics of all participants are analyzed according to the equilibrium
solution of tripartite dynamic game model.
Findings: the government’s allowance will be an important positive factor
to implement forest insurance. The loss of the insurance company, which the
lower insurance premium brings, can be compensated by the allowance from the government.
The more the government provides allowance, the more actively the insurance
company will implement forest insurance at a low insurance premium. In this
situation, the forest farmer will be more likely to purchase the forest
insurance, then the scope of forest insurance implementation will expend.
Originality/value: There is a complex and dynamic game relationship among
all participants in forest insurance market. Based on the tripartite dynamic
game model, to make the game relationship between each participant clear is
conducive to the implementation of forest insurance market in China.
Author: Ning Ma, Yang Zuo,
Kaili Liu, Yue Qi
Journal Code: jptindustrigg150095
