KRITIK FENOMENOLOGIS MERLEAU-PONTY ATAS FILSAFAT PENGETAHUAN
ABSTRACT: The main purpose of
this article consists in investigating the phenomenological perspective used by
Merleau-Ponty in evaluating critically the conception of knowledge. This
investigation is aimed at finding a new path for understanding the essence of
knowledge that is formulated by some philosophical mainstreams, such as
naturalism and objectivism. Ponty’s phenomenological critique to the philosophy
of knowledge is related to to the description of knowledge as a human
condition, which makes the thinking of the knowledge problem possible. The
phenomenological account that Ponty offers is that we experience ourselves, not
as distinct ‘minds’ and ‘bodies’, but as unified persons who form intentions
and act in the world, but can do so only because our bodies function
mechanically in certain ways. As being poured in his work “the Structure of
Behavior”, Ponty explained that the integration of matter, life and mind are
obtained by reduction to a common denominator of physical form. This
explanation emphasized that the Gestalists had misunderstood the ultimate
implications of their own work, because they believed that the notion of
structure can be thought within the naturalist ontology that subtended the
thought of the atomists whom they had criticized.
Penulis: Mukhtasar Syamsuddin
Kode Jurnal: jpperadabanislamdd100152
