R&D outsourcing contract for the unverified value of tacit knowledge sharing
Abstract: The purpose of this
paper is to provide a R&D outsourcing contract design framework to incent
R&D outsourcing service providers sharing tacit and explicit knowledge.
Design/methodology/approach: The author uses the principal-agent theory
to builds multitask principal-agent model which focuses on two cases. One case
is that the effort costs of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing are
complementary, but another is the effort costs are substitutable.
Findings: It was found that when the effort costs of explicit and tacit
knowledge sharing are mutually complementary the multitask R&D outsourcing
contract can incent tacit knowledge sharing. Moreover, the multitask R&D
outsourcing contract can motivate the effort of explicit knowledge sharing to
achieve system optimization, but it fails to motivate the effort of tacit
knowledge sharing to achieve system optimization.
Research limitations/implications: In this paper we only consider that
the outsourcing relationship is short-term, so the multitask R&D
outsourcing contract is formal. In fact, the outsourcing relationship may be long-term,
so the multitask R&D outsourcing contract is informal. In the long-term
cooperation the buyer can promise some reward which cannot be verified by
court. service providers choose to trust the promise of the buyer first. Once
the buyer don’t fulfill the promise, they not only lose the trust of service
providers in this cooperation, but also lose social trust and are seen as
dishonest enterprises.
Practical implications: Our study provides a theoretical model for
formulating an effective R&D outsourcing contract and promoting the
transfer of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing.
Originality/value: The paper extends prior literature by designing
multitask R&D outsourcing contract to share the tacit knowledge. We not
only consider the cost of substitution relationship between tacit knowledge and
explicit knowledge, but also considered the cost of complementary relationship.
Keywords: R&D Outsourcing,
Knowledge Sharing, Tacit Knowledge Value, Principal-Agent, Incentive Contract
Author: Han Song, YuQing Liu,
Ying Dai, Jing Zhu
Journal Code: jptindustrigg150087
