An Analysis on Behaviors of Real Estate Developers and Government in Sustainable Building Decision Making
Abstract: The Chinese
government takes measures to promote the development of green building (GB).
But until 2013, there are only few green buildings in China. The real estate
developers are skeptical in entering GB market, which requires theories to
explain developers and government’s behaviors.
Design/methodology/approach: In this study, we attempt Evolutionary game
theory and System dynamics (SD) into the analysis. A system dynamics model is
built for studying evolutionary games between the government and developers in
greening building decision making.
Findings and Originality/value: The results of mixed-strategy stability
analysis and SD simulation show that evolutionary equilibrium does not exist
with a static government incentive. Therefore, a dynamical incentive is
suggested in the SD model for promoting the green building market. The
symmetric game and asymmetric game between two developers show, if the primary
proportion who choose GB strategy is lower, all the group in game may finally
evolve to GB strategy. In this case and in this time, the government should
take measures to encourage developers to enter into the GB market. If the
proportion who choose GB strategy is high enough, the government should
gradually cancel or reduce those incentive measure.
Research limitations/implications: an Evolution Analysis and System
Dynamics Simulation on Behaviors of Real Estate Developers and Government could
give some advice for the government to promote the green building market.
Author: Xiuli Xie, Yisheng
Liu, Jing Hou
Journal Code: jptindustrigg140062
